As argued by a Iranian political strategist, “in Iran, the perception was that Likud is not serious about peace, so they do not need a scapegoat [Iran]. The outbreak of the Iraq-Iran War (q.v.) Itamar Rabinovich, former advisor to Rabin and Israeli ambassador to the US, Tel Aviv, 11 October 2004. Samuel Segev, The Iranian Triangle: The Untold Story of Israel’s Role in the Iran-Contra Affair, tr. According to a former Iranian official who worked closely with Khomeini, the Ayatollah’s view was that the Palestinian issue was primarily a Palestinian issue. Iran, which in the early 1990s reduced its financial support to Hezbollah and lacked strong ties and presence in the Palestinian territories, started to reach out and develop relations with rejectionist Palestinian groups after the Madrid conference. This distinction between Iran’s public posture and operational policy was exemplified by Khomeini’s blocking of attempts by more radical elements in the government to dispatch 10,000 Iranian soldiers to southern Lebanon to fight the Israelis (Chehabi, pp. ", Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Saeed Khatibzadeh has suggested that dialing down the temperature in the Persian Gulf was among the goals of communicating with Saudi Arabia. The shah’s efforts to distance Iran from Israel went so far that Israel feared that the Iranian monarch would severe all ties with the Jewish State (Segev, p. 89). By launching preemptive attacks on Hamas and the Hezbollah, Israel could significantly deprive Iran of its capabilities to retaliate against Israel in the event of an American assault on Iran. The Israeli-Iranian proxy war through Hezbollah culminated during the summer war of 2006, which signified a new and heightened phase in this conflict. He didn’t want to use rhetoric that would just antagonize the Iranians for no reason. The fall of Saddam, Iran’s deadly enemy who engaged it in an eight-year war (see IRAQ VII. David Menashri, Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society, and Power, London, 2001. Les liens de proximité et d’amitié entre les deux pays se sont détériorés au point de se muer en hostilité irréconciliable. In addition, the eruption of the second Intifada in 2000 and the deterioration of the situation in the Palestinian territories were met by a lowering of Iran’s profile on the Palestinian issue. By the end of the thirty-four day war, Hezbollah had won a stunning victory by simply having withstood and survived Israel’s onslaught. The Lebanese fought a high-tech war and paid as much attention to the media battle as they did to the fighting on the ground. ʿAli-Naqi ʿĀliḵāni, former minister of finance under the shah, Washington, D.C., 7 April 2004. At the second level, it should involve the Arab states neighboring Israel, and only at the third level should it involve Iran. Ce second volet débute avec la conférence de Madrid et la volonté des États-Unis de pacifier les relations entre Israël et ses voisins du Moyen-Orient. ), and the emergence of a pro-Iranian Shiʿite leadership in Iraq, the removal of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, America’s unpopularity in the region, the Arab governments’ perceived inability to act independently of Washington or oppose its policies, America’s perceived inability to push back Iran militarily, and Tehran’s unhindered march towards a nuclear capability all served to strengthen Iran’s position in the region and increase Israel’s strategic vulnerability. In the wake of the past two decades of acrimony between Iran and Israel, it may be hard to imagine that the countries ever had friendly relations and cooperation on multiple levels.Yet they were once friends and allies. Its nuclear and missile programs were viewed as a major threat to Israeli security, as was its alleged engagement in terrorism. Gradually, as the shah gained further power and expanded his ties with Washington, in conjunction with the enticing Iranian oil income and lucrative development plans, Israel had even better reasons to cultivate ties with Persia. As a result, in spite of its anti-Israeli ideology and rhetoric, geo-strategic forces compelled Iran to avoid any direct confrontation with Tel Aviv. But as Hamas sought to flex its international ties with calls from both Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the IDF issued a warning to any foes considering linking up with the Palestinian paramilitary force firing rockets at Israel. Initially just a small number of armed groups of young men organized under the banner of Islam and dedicated to fighting the Israeli occupation, over time they banded together into what has proved to be one of Israel’s most formidable foes, the Lebanese Hezbollah. This underlined the endurance of the geo-strategic forces bringing Israel and Iran together. Moreover, Israel wanted to avoid a scenario in which Iran and the United States would resume diplomatic ties while Iranian-Israeli relations were still hostile, since improved relations between them under such circumstances could come at the expense of Israel (IDF Radio, 10 November 1996). While the intent to befriend Persia existed prior to independence, it intensified in the late 1950s when Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion coined the “periphery concept.” It prescribed that in the absence of relations with its neighbors, Israel should seek the friendship of “the neighbors of the neighbors.” This was translated into a close, though informal, alliance with Persia (Gilad, 2002, p. 252; Gilboa, p. 257; Welāyati, 2001, pp. Depuis 1979, le nouveau régime a opéré un changement radical de sa politique étrangère, notamment concernant ses relations avec Israël. Books: Joseph Alpher, The Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications, New York, 1989. Meir Ezri, Mir vaḵem mi-kol ʿamo/Anyone of His People Among You: Mission in Iran, Or Yehuda, 2001 (in Hebrew). . Maḥmud Wāʿeẓi, for-mer Deputy Foreign Minister, Tehran, 16 August 2004. Interviews: Yossi Alpher, former Mossad official and senior advisor to Ehud Barak, Tel Aviv, 27 October 2004. En 2019, l’Iran a célébré le 40e anniversaire de la Révolution islamique. The effect of the decrease in the tension on Tehran’s perception of the peace process was crystallized one year later when Iran’s new president, Moḥammad Ḵātami, reinstated the policy of accepting any deal agreeable to the Palestinians, including a two-state solution (Interview, Ambassador Nežād-Ḥosayniān, Tehran, 12 August, 2004). The summer war between Israel and Lebanon took place against this backdrop. A Iranian victory, on the other hand, was not seen as negative since Iran’s ability to participate in a war against Israel remained minimal (Segev, p. 22). Les relations Iran-Israël sont passées des alliances politiques étroites entre les deux pays durant l'ère de la dynastie Pahlavi, aux hostilités à la suite de la montée au pouvoir de l'ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini.. L'histoire des Juifs Persans n'a jamais été interrompue en 2500 ans. And as we saw earlier, we see this attack by Hamas as a very severe attack, and we intend to hold them accountable for their aggression against Israel," IDF spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Conricus told Newsweek. Out of the Israeli invasion emerged a new and invigorated Shiʿite movement, inspired by Iran’s Islamic Revolution. Yet, for Iran to escalate tensions with Israel and intensify its rhetorical excesses at a time when it is facing increased pressure from Washington and Tel Aviv shows continuity rather than discontinuity in the behavior of Iranian government. 97-103; Fallāḥ-nežād, pp. While Iran has actively sought to undermine any peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians that would intensify Iran’s isolation, Israel has actively undermined efforts to improve U.S.-Iran relations due to its fear that Washington would betray Israeli interests in order to patch up its relations with Tehran. "Israel's peace partners in the region, like Israel, believe that a nuclear Iran is a major regional threat," Danon told Newsweek. According to an Israeli official, “the basic geo-political interests, which originally dictated an Israeli-Iranian link were far from being a mere whim of the Shah’s. Therefore, the Israel and Iran relation will worsening. A diatribe on the historical movements of the Hebrews has no place in a page on the international relations … The shah believed that his aspirations could be achieved within the framework of the existing order. Consequently, Iran should never be a front-line state against Israel (Interview, former Iranian official, Tehran, August, 2004). Relations of Turkey and Iran with Israel. The regional occurrences of 1958 (the formation of the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria in February, the collapse of Iraq’s pro-Western monarchy in July, and the subsequent collapse of the Baghdad Pact) augmented Persian concerns about Communist penetration and Arab radicalism and reinforced Persian decisions to enhance Israeli-Persian relations. Currently, the State of Israel maintains diplomatic relations with 164 U.N. member states, while the State of Palestine maintains diplomatic ties with 138, though its role at the international body is that of a non-member observer state due to the unresolved nature of the conflict that's raged between the two peoples since the end of the United Kingdom's colonial mandate in 1948. Israel’s strength and progress fascinated him, and its conflict with the Arab world and opposition to Communist influence in the region further promoted the strengthening of ties. Relations Israël-Iran-Hezbollah Publié par ahmedmiloud octobre 7, 2019 janvier 15, 2020 Publié dans Uncategorized Malgré leur animosité apparente l’un envers l’autre, L’Iran et Israël n’ont jamais cessé leurs échanges commerciaux. Coming "We're prepared for a wide range of scenarios. In addition, Iran had since 1976 experienced a relative decline, fueled by the rise of Iraqi power. Submitted tags will be reviewed by site administrator before it is posted online.If you enter several tags, separate with commas. As a result, Iraq remained Israel’s primary threat, and Iran its preferred partner in balancing Iraq. The Israeli accounts were confirmed by the Islamic Republic’s News Agency (IRNA), which reported that the Likud was seeking to settle its political issues with Tehran through the assistance of Iranian Jews (IRNA, 24 July 1996). The Iran-Iraq War reinforced the common Israeli-Iranian threat picture and increased hopes in Israel that Iran would realize the utility of an alliance with Tel Aviv. Publicly, the Islamic Republic took an uncompromising position on Israel, calling for its destruction and vehemently criticizing any Muslim country that negotiated with Tel Aviv. Ben-Gurion was the first Israeli prime minister to visit Tehran (December 1961), setting the precedent for visits of prominent officials on both sides. Persia’s involvement in Lebanon and support for Islamist movements (Hamas, Hizballah and Islamic Jihad) has made it more directly involved it in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Idem, “Iranian-Israeli relations (1949-1979): Diplomacy under cover,” in M. Yager, Y. Govrin and A. Oded, eds., Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The First Fifty Years, Jerusalem, 2002, I, pp. Although these hesitant initial steps gained significant momentum since the White Revolution (a series of economic and social reforms announced by the shah in January 1963), they remained informal. 159-201; Fallāḥ-nežād, pp. 177-80, 197; Fallāḥ-nežād, pp. The first indication that Washington was not inclined to include Iran in future regional decision making was President George H. W. Bush’s justification of the decision not to dethrone Saddam. Between 1973 and 1974 alone, Israeli exports to Persia almost doubled (State of Israel, p. 101; see also data in Welāyati, 2001, pp. Idem, Irān wa taḥawwolāt-e Felestin: 1939-1979, Tehran, 2001. Although domestic concerns regulated relations in the initial years of Israel’s independence, later regional and domestic developments encouraged the expansion of ties. Eliezer Tsafrir, Big Satan, Small Satan: Revolution and Escape in Iran, Or Yehuda, 2002 (in Hebrew). This pipeline initially transferred annually more than ten million tons of oil, which was more than Israel’s annual consumption (Ezri, pp. In September 1982, under direction of Defense Minister Sharon, a Lebanese Christian militia unit entered the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila in Beirut, and, with tacit Israeli approval, raped, killed, and maimed as many as several thousand civilian refugees. Taking into consideration the historical timeline of brutal conflicts of Israel with many Arab countries, specifically Iran and Israel have not always been particularly on bad terms. Much like the shah, Iran’s religious leaders sought a central role for Iran in the affairs of the region, but while the language through which the shah articulated Iran’s ambitions was one of Iranian nationalism, the clerics expressed the same aspirations through a religious lexicon. 289-332; Ezri, pp. Washington Post, 10 January 1978. Intimate cooperation between the security agencies developed and economic ties rocketed forward (Gilboa, pp. In the early 1970s, several regional developments threatened to obstruct their flourishing relations. The Iranians also used intelligence provided by the United States to find and kill Al-Qaeda (al-Qāʾda) leaders that were slipping into Iran from Afghanistan.